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We formulate a two-country endogenous growth model which explain
joint determination of long-run trade patterns and world growth rates.
After providing the existence and local stability of the continuum of bal-
anced growth paths, we show that main standard trade propositions hold
under some modiﬁcations and that, subject to certain conditions concern-
ing social and private rankings of factory intensities between production
sectors, the higher is the growth rate, the smaller is the volume of inter-
national trade among balanced growth paths in the continuum. .
WWe thank Christian Ghiglino, Takashi Kamihigashi,and Gerhard Sorger for their useful
comments on the earlier version of the paper.




11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The two(-country) by two(-tradable good) by two(-factor) Heckscher-Ohlin (H-
O) model has been a fundamental general equilibrium framework in trade theory
for a long time. Innumberable articles and volumes have been published to
extend the H-O model to various directions in such a way that many important
realistic issues like increasing returns, externalities, market imperfections, non-
traded goods, and trade policies... are incorporated into it. However, there are
only few contributions that extend the H-O model to explain the pattern of
trade and the long-run world growth rate jointly in an uniﬁed framework.1
This paper attempts to provide such a framework. We develop a two by two
by two dynamic (à la Heckscher-Ohlin) trade model of international trade and
endogenous growth to discuss what jointly determines the long-run pattern of
international trade and the long-run growth rate. We also examine whether the
main trade propositions in the static H-O model, i.e., the factor-price equal-
ization theorem, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the Rybczynski theorem, the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem and the law of comparative advantage, continue to
hold in some modiﬁed forms. We ﬁnd that while the ﬁrst three trade theorems
basically hold, the last two theorems need to be modiﬁed: we show that, other
things being equal, the international dierence in the ”psychic costs” in gener-
ating new human capital can be a determinant of the long-run trade pattern.2
On the one hand, the endogenous growth/trade model in this paper share
the following property with the exogenous growth/trade model developed by
Chen [6] and Shimomura [11]; there is a continuum of balanced growth paths
with dierent patterns and volumes of international trade3 and any equilibrium
path starting from historically given initial international distribution of physical
and human capitals converges to a balanced growth path in the continuum. On
the other hand, while the long-run growth rate is naturally the same for any
balanced growth path and hence uniquely determined in the exogenous growth
models, we see that in the present endogenous growth/trade model balanced
growth paths in the continuum have dierent pair of .long-run growth rate and
the volume of trade. Thus, we can argue whether or not a balanced growth path
with a higher growth rate involves a larger world trade volume.
After establishing the existence and local stability of the continuum of bal-
anced growth paths, we examine whether or not the above main trade propo-
sitions can substantially hold for the continuum as a whole. As we already
mentioned, we can show that the long-run pattern of trade is determined by the
international dierence in the above ”psychic costs”.
1A notable preceding contribution is, among others, Ventura [12]. .
2By psychic cost we mean disutily accompanying the acquisition of new skill and knowledge.
It is a sort of adjustment cost when human capital is augmented.
3Since we deal with balanced growth path with positive growth rates, the volume of trade
in the sense of the volumes of exports and imports also grow. When we say ”the volume of
trade is large (small)”, we mean that the ratio of the volume to the world physical capital is
large (small).
2We then move to focus on the relationship between growth rate and trade
volume among balanced growth paths in the continuum. One may usually
associate globalization with rapid world growth, However, we ﬁnd a theoreti-
cal possibility such that the relationship is reversed: Under certain conditions
concerning social and private rankings of factor intensities between production
sectors, the higher is the growth rate, the smaller is the volume of international
trade among balanced growth paths in the continuum.
Formerly speaking, the anti-intuitive relationship is closely related to the
issue called local indeterminacy4 which has been extensively studied in macro-
economic theory over decade. Among exogenous growth models, Benhabib and
Nishimura [3] ﬁrst made clear that indeterminacy is possible in a multi-sector
model of closed economy with factor-generated externality even if returns to
scale are constant from the social perspective. Nishimura and Shimomura [9]
extended it to a two-country dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin model of international
trade and showed that the introduction of externality induces indeterminacy
which may reverse the pattern of trade along the equilibrium path. Later,
Nishimura and Shimomura [10] also showed that indeterminacy can be gener-
ated even without introducing externality; they presented a two-country dy-
namic trade model in which indeterminacy is based on the lack of international
lending and borrowings. .
For endogenous growth models, Bond, Wang and Yip [4] studied a two-
sector model of closed economy. It was extended to an open economy model
by Bond, Trask and Wang [5]. By introducing externalities into a multi-sector
endogenous growth model, Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura [2] provided a factor
intensity condition under which indeterminacy may occur. We shall extend it
to a two-country model.
The extension of the closed economy to a two-country framework is not
straightforward in the endogenous growth model. Bond, Trask, and Wang focus
only on a balanced growth path in the world economy, and no transitional dy-
namics is deﬁned in their model. We introduce "psychic cost" and externality in
our model so that transitional dynamics may be well-deﬁned and indeterminacy
may arise in the two-country endogenous growth model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the endogenous growth/trade
model. Section 3 give the formal deﬁnition of balanced growth paths. Section 4
discusses under what conditions balanced growth paths exists Section 5 studies
two types of local stability which have dierent implications for the relationship
between long-run growth rate and volume of international trade in the contin-
uum of balanced growth paths. Section 6 characterizes the two types of BGP’s
and obtains main trade-theoretic propositions. Section 7 concludes.
4A related work was done by Farmer and Lahiri [7]. They formulate a two-country en-
dogenous growth model. Introducing externalities into the endogenous growth model, they
show that the model has one symmetric and two asymmetric equilibria such that there is a
continuum of switching equilibrium paths among the three equilibria.
32 The Model
2.1 Production
The trading world consists of two countries, the home country and the foreign
country. Two tradable goods, an investment good and a consumption good, are
produced by using physical and human capitals both of which are internationally
immobile. We call the tradable goods good 1a n dgood 2, respectively. There is
no international dierence in production technology and the production function





i ,i =1 ,2, (1)




i are factor-generated externality terms and % > 0 is a shift
parameter. Just for notational brevity we set % to be unity for the time being.
We assume 1i > 0,2i > 0,b 1i > 0,b 2i > 0 and 1i + 2i + b1i + b2i =1 ,
which mean that the production function shows constant returns to scale from
the social perspective but decreasing returns from the private perspective. Let






















Since the endowments of the foreign country are given by L and K, outputs










Let Pi,w and r be the prices of good i, the factor rewards of human and
physical capitals. As technologies are internationally identical, the same domes-
tic prices (w, r) prevail in the foreign country under incomplete specialization
in both countries: the factor price equalization theorem holds in our framework.
Proﬁt maximization implies
Pi1i = wa1i,P i2i = ra2i (5)

















4where  = 1122  1221. If  > (<)0, the consumption good, good 2, is
physical (human) capital intensive from the private perspective.
Let the investment good, good 1, be the numeraire: P1 =1 . Then P2 = p is
the price of good 2 in terms of good 1.


















By solving (8) with respect to w and r,
w(p)=% ˆ wpe 21/e ,r (p)=%ˆ rp




































We denote pw0 (p)/w(p) by w, and pr0 (p)/r(p) by r. If b  > (<)0, the
consumption good is capital (labor) intensive from the social perspective.




,i , j =1 ,2 (11)
2.2 Households
Next let us consider the dynamic optimization problem an home household
faces. The population of each country is normalized to be one. Each household





etdt,0 <  < 1, > 0 (12)
subject to
•
K = Y1 + pY2  pC
=( wL+ rK)+  pC (13)
•
L = ZL1, 0 <  < 1 (14)
5where Z is disutility, or psychic cost, for accumulating human capital L; K is
physical capital;  is the subjective discount rate;  i st h ei n v e r s eo ft h ei n -
tertemporal elasticity of substitution. Note that  is generally positive because
of decreasing returns from the private perspective.
(13) is the ﬂow budget constraint. In this paper we follow Benhabib and
Nishimura [3] and Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura [2] in assuming some kind
of entry barriers that make possible positive proﬁts. An alternative assumption
would be that there are sector-speciﬁc factors with negative externalities in each
industry in such a way that both social and private returns to scale are constant
concerning both general and speciﬁc factors of production as a whole. Under
the assumption,  is interpreted as the sector-speciﬁc factor income and we do
not need to assume entry barriers.
(14) is the human-capital formation function in this paper. We assume the
followings
(i) Each household can increase her human capital, i.e., knowledge and skill,
by studying and learning new knowledge and skill. In order to obtain
more human capital, she has to pay larger psychological or disutility cost.
(ii) The larger is her existing stock of human, the higher the productivity of
disutilty cost is.
(iii) Solving the above dynamic optimization problem, she recognizes the pos-
itive relationship between L and ˙ L which is assumed in (ii)5.




+ [rK + wL+   pC]+MZL1 (15)
The necessary conditions for optimality are
CH
CC
= C  p =0 (16a)
CH
CZ
= Z + MZ1L1 =0 (16b)
•
K = wL+ rK +   pC (16c)
•
L = ZL1 (16d)
•
 =   r (16e)
•
M = M  w  M(1  )ZL (16f)
5Let N be the home population. Since we assume that the population of each country
is constant over time, we can derive the aggregate human capital formation function from




L = NZ#L13# =( NZ)#(NL)13#
6and the transversality condition
limt$4[etK(t)(t)+etL(t)M(t)] = 0 (17)
The second-order condition for maximizing the Hamiltonian with respect to Z
is satisﬁed if the following holds.
ASSUMPTION 1:  < 21 < 1  .
We can similarly formulate the dynamic optimization problem for each for-








where an asterisk(*) is attached to each foreign variable. The parameter b
denotes the international dierence in ability to generate new human capital6.
The necessary conditions for optimality are
CH
CC =( C)














 =   r (19e)
•
M = M  w  Mb(1  )Z
L
(19f)
and the transversality condition
limt$4[etK(t)(t)+etL(t)M(t)] = 0 (20)
In what follows we assume  = , and  = .
Finally, the world market-clearing condition for the consumption good is
C + C = Y2 + Y 
2 (21)
Equations, (16a)-(17), (19a)-(20) and (21), give the complete two-country dy-
namic general equilibrium (DGE) model. Note that the co-state (jump) vari-
ables are , ,M,and M.
6The parameter b reﬂects environmental dierences between two countries: Even if home
and foreign people have the same ability to generate new human capital, people who live in a
more harsh natutal environment have b that is lower than people in the other country.
72.3 Growth Paths under Incomplete Specialization
Let us focus on DGE paths under incomplete specialization in both countries.
Combining (6), (7) and (9) together, we derive
Y1 + pY2 =




1 + pY 
2 =












Making use of (22a)-(22d), we can write the above dynamic equilibrium
system as follows:


































L = ZL1 (23d)
•
L = b(Z)(L)1 (23e)
•
 = [  r(p)] (23f)
•
 = [  r(p)] (23g)
•
M = M[  (1  )ZL]  w(p) (23h)
•
M = M[  b(1  )(Z)(L)]  w(p) (23i)
Z = MZ1L1 (23j)
Z = bM(Z)1(L)1 (23k)
(23a) follows from the world market clearing condition (21), (16a), (19a),
(22c) and (22d). Note that m  / is time-invariant from (23f) and (23g).
In what follows, we assume that the two sectors have dierent factor intensities
both from the social and private perspectives;
Assumption 2:ˆ  6=0 .
8If externality is absent,  = ˆ . Note that if there is, it is possible that
sign[]=sign[ˆ ] 6=0 . As was shown in Benhabib and Nishimura [3] and
Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura [2], and as will be shown in this paper, this
dierence in private and social factor-intensity rankings is crucial for indeter-
minacy to occur.
Let S be the total capital stock level in the world economy; S  K + K.
Since ¯ ij  ij/, (23a)-(23c) imply
˙ S =( L + L)w(p)¯ 22  Sr(p)¯ 12 (24)
We simplify the model by reducing the numbers of both dierential equations
and unknowns. Let l  L/S, l  L/S,   1//S,   M1//S ,










































































where R(p,l + l)  (l + l)w(p)22  r(p)12, and A  /(1    ).This
is the simpliﬁed system to be analyzed subsequently.
3 Balanced Growth Paths
We deﬁne a balanced growth path (BGP) as a solution to the above dynamic
model for given initial conditions, if all but co-state variables grow at a common
and time-invariant rate g>0 while all the co-state variables decreases at a rate
g<0.
9We study conditions under which a BGP of the system (25a)-(25h) exists.














)A  R(p,l + l) (26b)
0=b1+AA(
l

































w(p)  R(p,l + l) (26f)
0=[ r(p)¯ 11  (l + l)w(p)¯ 22]k  w(p)l(¯ 21  ¯ 22)  p1 1
 (26g)
0=[ r(p)¯ 11  (l + l)w(p)¯ 22]k  w(p)l(¯ 21  ¯ 22)  m 1
p1 1
 (26h)
For a given  > 0, a system of eight equations (26a)-(26h) determines, values





Making some calculations, we can obtain (l,l,,,,k,k) as the functions
of p.





{w(p)(¯ 21  ¯ 22)l(p)+p1 1
(p)}
r(p)¯ 11  (1 + ¯ 12)(r(p)  r1)
(29)
k(p) 
{w(p)(¯ 21  ¯ 22)l(p)+p1 1
(p)m1/}




1    

¶1/
(r2  r(p))1/(p) (31)
(p)  w(p)1/
µ
1    

¶1/
(r2  r(p))1/m1/(p) (32)
(p) 












1    

¶1/








1    
>  (36)
Substituting (27), (28) and (33) into (26a), we obtain the BGP world market-
clearing condition
zc  [(r(p))  %(r(p))] + m1/[(r(p))  b
1+A







 [( + 12)r(p)  ]
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The ﬁrst parenthesis in (37) denotes the home BGP excess demand for the
consumption good (good 2) and the rest of (37) is the foreign BGP excess
demand.
In order for all BGP quantities are positive, it is necessary that (p) is
positive. Thus, considering (33), we have to make the following assumption.
Assumption 3: sign[ 1
¯ 22(1 + ¯ 12)] = sign[ + 12] > 0
Note that (6) can be rewritten as
Y1/S = w¯ 22l  r¯ 12k
Y2/S =
r¯ 11k  w¯ 21l
p
If m = b =1 , it follows from (26a) and the deﬁnition of R that Y1/S = Y 
1 /S =
p1 1
 and 2Y2/S =2 Y 
2 /S = R(p,2l). Therefore, if  > 0 and r> along a
BGP, the production in both countries are incompletely specialized along it at
least for m and b that are su!ciently close to 1. In the next section we study
under what conditions such BGP’s exist.
114 The existence of BGP’s
Now, let us investigate under what conditions (37) has a solution p.F i r s t ,i ti s
clear from (9) that if there exists r that satisﬁes (37), we have the solution p.
Second, suppose that 1/ and
1
 are such that, if a is negative, a1/ and
a
1
 are imaginary numbers7. Since imaginary numbers make no economic
sense, we focus only on a solution such that
r2 
(1  )
1    
>r>.
Third, we have to take into account the transversality condition (17), which is
satisﬁed along a BGP only if
g  g    0, 8
and if
g  g   < 0
Since (24) and (26d) imply that g = R = 1
(r  ), this strict inequality holds





which is smaller than r2 
(1)
1. That is, we have to ﬁnd a solution of (37)
such that
 <r (p) <

1  
Based on the foregoing preliminary remarks, let us ﬁrst consider the graph
of (38). We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: (i) 0(r)=0has a unique solution r in (,r 2). (ii)  < r<r 0 
/(1  ) <r 2.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Thus, the graph of (r) is U-shaped with limr$+ (r) = limr$r2 (r)=
4. Moreover, 0(r0) > 0. See Figure 1.








7For example, if 1/j is 2.5 and a = 31, then a1/j =( 31)2×(31)0.5 = i, a pure imaginary
number.
8Recall that \ and M grow at 3jg.
12Note that Assumption 1 guarantees that
r2 
(1  )




Second, for any particular ¯ r 5 (0,
21
21) and for any positive ¯ ,w ec a nc h o o s e
a value of parameter % such that
%(¯ r)=¯ 
Therefore, we can choose a value of % such that the graphs of (r) and %(r)
intersects (at least) twice9,s a y(re)=%(re) and (¯ re)=%(¯ re) in such a
way that
 <r e < ¯ re <r 0
See Figure 2. It is clear from the ﬁgure that 0(re)  0
%(re) < 0 and 0(¯ re) 
0
%(¯ re) > 0. Let us summarize the existence result obtained in this section.
PROPOSITION 1: If b and m are su!ciently close to one, there is an
open set of parameter values % such that at least two BGP’s exist between  and
r0.
Remark 1: Both re and ¯ re are greater than , and  is positive. Therefore,
as we already remarked, as long as m and b are close to one, all BGP quantities
including outputs in both countries are positive.
Remark 2: It is clear that the existence result holds at least for any m
closed to unity. Therefore, we now obtain the continuum of BGP’s each of
which corresponds to a dierent value of m.
5 The stability of BGP’s
Now, let us study the local stability of the continuum of BGP’s. For simplicity,
we focus on the symmetric BGP such that b = m =1 . Let us denote by pe
(resp. ¯ pe) the solution to r(p)=re (resp. r(p)=¯ re). Dierentiating (37) with









= sign[r0(pe)] = sign[ˆ ] (40)
9Thus, re is the least one and ¯ re is the largest one. Note that [0




ˆ q22(1 3 j)




Therefore, the intersections of x(r) and [0(r) are exactly two if
ˆ q22(13j)






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
p=¯ pe
]=sign[r0(¯ pe)[0(r(¯ pe))  0
%(r(¯ pe))]]
= sign[r0(¯ pe)] = sign[ˆ ] (41)
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8
,
where the superscript T attached to a vector means that the row (resp. column)
vector is transposed to the column (reap. row) vector. The linearized dynamical
system around the BGP corresponding to rbgp( re or ¯ re. All variables with
















where xp  p  pbgp and
XT 
£




l  lbgp l  l
bgp   bgp   bgp   
bgp k  kbgp
¤
First, we show how d


































= sign[ˆ ] (44)





21 22  I
¸
=0 , (45)
where I is the 5 × 5 identity matrix.
Proof: See Appendix 8.2.
To simplify the characteristic equation, we use the BGP equations that are
obtained from (34), (35) and (36):
rbgp  

=2 ( pbgp)1 1
bgp = A(l/)A = R(pbgp,2lbgp)=gbgp (46)
0=( /)w(pbgp)  {  (1    )R(pbgp,2lbgp)} (47)
where R(pbgp,2lbgp)=2 lbgpw(pbgp)22r(pbgp)12.Based on the equations, J()
becomes10
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
11 w21 w21 2p1 1
 000
lRp AR  wl22   wl22 0  l
AR 00
lRp wl22 AR  wl22   00  l
AR 0
[r0







G G   00
[Gw0

















C Q  
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(48)
where
G    (1    )R
G  G  (1  )AR

  (1  )AR  wl22
Q  r(p)¯ 11  2lw(p)¯ 22
10For notational brevity, we abbreviate”bgp” in what follows.
15We shall prove under what conditions J()=0has at least two roots with
negative real parts, in which case the continuum of an equilibrium path from
given initial stock (l(0),l  (0),k(0)) converges to a BGP in the continuum.
Suppose that J ()=0has just two roots with negative real parts and four
roots with positive real parts. Then, for each initial point (l(0),l (0),k(0)) in
the neighborhood of the symmetric BGP there exists a two dimensional manifold
such that an equilibrium path from the initial point and along the manifold
converges to a BGP in the continuum which possibly diers from the symmetric
BGP. Thus, as long as an initial point is in the neighborhood of the symmetric
BGP, there exists an equilibrium path converging to a BGP in the continuum.
We call this case TYPE-I stability.
Suppose that J () has three roots with negative real parts. for each initial
point (l(0),l  (0),k(0)) in a neighborhood of the symmetric BGP there exists
((0),(0),(0)) such that a dynamic equilibrium path from the initial point
converges to the symmetric BGP. Even if we choose a asymmetric BGP that
corresponds to a value of m su!ciently close but not equal to 1, the charac-
teristic equation has three roots with negative real parts. It follows that for
the same (l(0),l (0),k(0)) there exists another ((0),(0),(0)) such that
an equilibrium path from the initial point converges to the continuum. There
are inﬁnitely many equilibrium paths from each initial point (l(0),l (0),k(0)).
We call this case TYPE-II stability.11
Making some tedious calculations, we can factorize J() as follows12.
J()=2p1 1
(Q  )J1()J2(), (49)
where
J1()  
2  {  (1  )R} + ARG (50)
J2() 



















(G  )(AR  2wl22  )






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(51)
Let us check the characteristic roots corresponding to each factor in (49).
First, consider the factor J1(). PROPOSITION 1 states that the two BGP
rental rates, re and ¯ re, are in between  and r0  /(1), and Lemma 1 ensures
us that r2 >r 0. It follows from ASSUMPTION 1, (26d), i.e., R = 1
(r), and
11As we mentioned in the introductory section, this case corresponds to local indeterminacy
discussed in the macroeconomic literature.
12The derivation of (49) is available from the authors on request.
16the deﬁnition of G that
  (1  )R =
(1  )

(r0  r) > 0
G    (1    )R
=
(1    )

(r2  r) > 0
Therefore, the deﬁnition of J1() leads us to the results that (i) J1(0) =
ARG > 0 and (ii) J1()=0has two roots with positive real parts.
Second, let us turn to the factor J2(). Combining (45) and (49) at  =0 ,


















It follows from J1(0) = ARG > 0 that

















sign[J2(0)]p=pe = sign[ˆ ]=sign[J2(0)]p=¯ pe (54)
Proof. See Appendix 8.3.
5.1 CASE 1:r(¯ pe) < and + r0(
4
13j)
Let us choose the positive parameter % very small so that r(¯ pe) is smaller than
but very close to r0(

1). First, Lemma 3 implies that if ˆ  > 0, then
J2(0) > 0 at p =¯ pe.
Second, we can prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4: If ˆ  > 0 and  is su!ciently small, then J0
2(0) > 0 at r(¯ pe).
17Proof. See Appendix 8.4.





























It follows from ˆ  > 0 and  < 1 that 11 < 0. Those three facts lead us to
the lemma as follows.
Lemma 5: Choose the positive parameter % very small so that r(pe) is
smaller than but very close to r0. If ˆ  > 0 and  is su!ciently small, then
J2()=0has one positive real root and two roots with negative real parts.
Proof: See Appendix 8.5.
5.2 CASE 2:r(pe) > and + 4
Next, let us choose the positive parameter % very small so that r(pe) is larger
than but very close to . Then R + 0, ¯ G ; G ; , and 
 = wl22. It follows
from (51) that
J2() +
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(r0









(  )Rp (  )(2wl22 + )
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯

















Inspecting this equation and considering that
sign[ˆ ]=sign[r0]=sign[w0]=sign[Rp]sign[],



































has two roots with negative real parts. It follows that if we can show in CASE
2t h a t11 is negative for a su!ciently small , then we arrive at the following
lemma.
Lemma 6: Choose the positive parameter % very small so that r(pe) is
larger than but very close to . If  > 0, ˆ  < 0 and  is su!ciently small,
then J2()=0has one positive real root that is close to  and two roots with
negative real parts.
Proof. See Appendix 8.6.
5.3 the sign of Q
What remains to investigate concerning stability is the sign of Q
Q  r(p)¯ 11  2lw(p)¯ 22
along a BGP. If Q>0 under either of the above two cases, we have TYPE-l
stability On the other hand, if Q<0, we have TYPE-II stability.
First, considering r   = R(p,2l)={2lw¯ 22  r¯ 12}, we have







[r(¯ 11  ¯ 12)  (r  )]
Thus, suppose that there is no externality. Then ij = ˆ ij and  = ˆ  =
11  12, which implies that ¯ 11  ¯ 12 =
1112





which has to be positive due to the transversality condition. That is, if no




11  12 < 0 and  > 0,
13Note that in the case of no externaity, we have {ˆ { = ˆ {2 > 0. Thus, the previous
argument concerning the sign of 12 m e a n st h a tw ec a ns a yt h a ti nt h i sc a s ew eh a v el o c a l
determinacy for a BGP value ¯ pe for which r(¯ pe) is close to r0.
19which are possible (only if there is externality) and compatible with ˆ  > 0.
Then Q<0 and we have TYPE-II stability at a BGP value pe for which r(pe)
is close to 14.
Let us summarize the stability results obtained in this section.
PROPOSITION 2: (i) If ˆ  > 0 and  is su!ciently small, then there is
an open interval of the parameter value of % such that a BGP at ¯ pe corresponding
to each % in the interval is TYPE-I stable and r(¯ pe) is smaller than but close to
r0. (ii) If  > 0, ˆ  < 0, 11 12 < 0, and  is su!ciently small, then there is
an open interval of the parameter value % such that a BGP at pe corresponding
to each % in the interval is locally indeterminate and r(pe) is close to . In the
case of no externality, we never have TYPE-II stability.
6 C h a r a c t e r i z i n gt h et w ot y p e so fB G P ’ s
Based on the foregoing argument, we now have two types of locally stable BGP’s.
(i) a TYPE-I BGP (IBGP), which is obtained if ˆ  > 0 and  is su!ciently
small..
(ii) a TYPE-II BGP (IIBGP), which is obtained if  > 0, ˆ  < 0, 1112 <
0, and  is su!ciently small.
As we remarked at the end of the last section, in the standard case with no
externality we could only have an IBGP.
Let us characterize each of the two types by using Table 1 and Figures 3
and 4. In what follows we focus on the case such that the ”psychic costs” of
generating new human capital is larger in the foreign country; that is, we assume
b<1.
14In the indeterminacy case,
Q = r¯ q11 3 r¯ q12 3
1
j
(r 3 4) < 0
Thus, the denominators of (29) and (30) are negative. One may wonder whether the numer-
ators are also positive. Fortunatorily the answer is yes. For, using (27), we can rewrite the
numerators as
j[(¯ q21 3 ¯ q22)wl + p13 1
 b]
= j[(¯ q21 3 ¯ q22)wl +
1
2








[jr(¯ q11 3 ¯ q12) 3 (r 3 4)],
which implies that k =1 /2 > 0, as was to be obtained.
206.1 IBGP
We summarize the main results concerning IBGP in Figure 3 and the ﬁrst
column of Table 1. The point E is a IBGP.15 Note that, depending on the value
of m, t h e r ei sac o n t i n u u mo fI B G P ’ sf r o mEh to Ef, w h i c ha r et h eh o m ea n d
foreign autarkic IBGP’s, respectively. Which BGP is realized is determined by
the historically given initial condition of all state variables.
6.1.1 trade pattern
It is clear from Figure 3 that (r(¯ pe)) > %(r(¯ pe)). That is, if b<1, the
home country exports Good 2, the consumption good, along any IBGP in the
continuum. Intuition behind this result is that since the foreign household incurs
a higher disutility than the home household in order to produce the same amount
of new human capital, it wants to consume more instead of accumulating human
capital. Thus, the foreign country imports the consumption good. Note that
the factor-intensity ranking, from both of the private perspective (i.e., the sign
of ) and the social perspective (i.e., the sign of ˆ ), does not aect the pattern
of trade along any IBGP.
PROPOSITOIN 3: The country whose psychic costs of generating new
human capital is more expensive than the other country exports the investment
good.
6.1.2 the relationship between growth rates and the (relative) vol-
ume of trade




(r(¯ pe)  )
Thus, the higher is r(¯ pe) along a BGP, the higher the long-run growth rate. On
the other hand, the vertical dierence between (r(¯ pe)) and %(r(¯ pe)) is the
BGP volume of trade of good 2 (the consumption good) divided by the total
capital stock in the world economy, S = K + K, which we thereafter call the
relative volume of trade. Hence, Figure 3 shows that the higher is r(¯ pe) along
a BGP, the higher is the relative volume of trade. The following proposition
holds.
PROPOSITION 4: The higher is the long-run growth rate, the larger is
the foreign relative volume of the consumption good.





Figure 2,r (¯ pe).
216.1.3 the law of comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin
relationship
According to Proposition 3, if one country can produce new human capital
less e!ciently than the other country, then the former country imports the
consumption good. That is, the trade pattern depends on whether b is larger
or smaller than one. On the other hand, it is recognized in the standard trade
theory that trade pattern is closely related to (i) the international dierences in
(i) autarkic prices and (ii) BGP factor endowment ratios.
the law of comparative advantage If the autarkic BGP price of a tradable
good in terms of the other good is lower than the foreign autarkic price, then it
is said that the home country has comparative advantage in the tradable good.
The law of comparative advantage is that each country exports a good in which
the country has comparative advantage.
Is PROPOSITION 3 compatible with the law of comparative advantage?
See Figure 3, where ¯ ph
e and ¯ pf
e are the BGP autarkic prices of the consumption
good in the home and foreign countries respectively. PROPOSITION 3 asserts
that the home country exports good 2, i.e., the consumption good. Since r(
¯ ph
e) <r (¯ pe) <r (¯ pf
e) as is shown in Figure 3, the law of comparative advantage,
¯ ph
e < ¯ pf
e, holds i the consumption good is capital intensive from the social
perspective, i.e., r0(p) > 0.
the Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern The international dierence in the
factor endowment ratios plays an important role to determine the long-run trade
pattern in the standard trade theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern is
that each country exports a good whose production intensively uses the factor
of production which is relatively abundant in the country. Let us compare the





{w(¯ pe)(¯ 21  ¯ 22)+b
1+A
A (¯ pe)1 1
w(¯ pe)1/(r(¯ pe))1}




, if b<(resp. >)1.
That is,
k(¯ pe)
l(¯ pe) is smaller (resp. larger) than
k(¯ pe)
l(¯ pe) if b is smaller (resp. larger)
than one. Thus, we can say that under the condition that b is smaller (resp.
larger) than one, the Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern is established if the con-
sumption good is more physical capital (resp. human capital) intensive, i.e., if
r0(¯ pe) > (resp. <)0.
Summarizing the foregoing argument, we see that
22• if b<(resp. >)1 and r0(¯ pe) > (resp. <)0, then both the law of compara-
tive advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern hold.
• if b<(resp. >)1 and r0(¯ pe) < (resp. >)0, then neither the law of com-
parative advantage nor the Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern holds.
We now arrive at the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: The Heckscher-Ohilin trade pattern and the law of
comparative advantage holds together if sign(r0(¯ pe)) = sign(1  b). Neither of
them holds if sign(r0(¯ pe)) = sign(1  b).
6.1.4 factor price equalization, Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski
Recalling the production structure stated in Section 2, we see that factor price
equalization holds. Comparing IBGP’s in the above continuum, it is clear that
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem holds concerning the social factor-intensity rank-
ing (See (9)) while the Rybczynski theorem holds concerning the private factor-
intensity ranking (See (6)).
6.2 IIBGP
We summarize the main results concerning IIBGP in Figure 4 and the second
column of Table 1. The point F is a IIBGP. Note that, depending on the value
of m, there is a continuum of IIBGP’s from Fh to Ff, which are the home and
foreign autarkic IBGP’s, respectively. Which BGP is realized is determined by
the historically given initial condition of all state variables.
6.2.1 trade pattern
However, whichever IIDBGP is realized, the same pattern of trade is realized.
As is depicted in Figure 4, along any IIDBGP on FhFf the home country always
exports the consumption good, if b<1. The trade pattern is reversed if b>1;
PROPOSITION 3 holds whether IBGP or IIBGP.
6.2.2 the relationship between growth rates and the (relative) vol-
ume of trade
On the other hand, comparing Figures 3 and 4, we see that the relationship
between growth rates and the (relative) volume of trade in the continuum of
IIBGP’s is opposite to that in the continuum of IBGP’s. In the former contin-
uum the higher is the BGP r(pe), i.e., the higher is the growth rate, the smaller
is the relative volume of trade of good 2.
236.2.3 the law of comparative advantage and the Heckscher-Ohlin
relationship








r(pe)¯ 11  (1 + ¯ 12)(r(pe)  r1)
,
both the denominator and the numerator are negative along a IIBGP. Therefore,






It follows that if r0(pe) < (resp. >)0, then the home country exports the good for
which she has comparative advantage and the trade pattern is Heckscher-Ohlin.
We have the following result.
PROPOSITION 50 : Trade pattern is Heckscher-Ohlin and the law of
comparative advantage holds together if sign(r0(¯ pe)) = sign(1  b).
6.2.4 Factor price equalization, Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski
There is no dierence in those three issues between IBGP and IIBGP.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have tried to provide a dynamic trade model of international
trade and endogenous growth that can be regarded as a development of the
conventional two by two by two Heckscher-Ohlin model. While we are not the
ﬁrst to explore an endogenous growth trade theory, we believe that we ﬁrst
provide a dynamic trade model with constant-returns-to-scale technologies in
which both existence and stability of balanced growth paths with incomplete
specialization in both countries are established. Moreover, we show that under
some conditions concerning production technologies and externalities a contin-
uum of indeterminate balanced growth paths is possible and that any balanced
growth path in the continuum has the same pattern of international trade.
In international trade theory the eects of economic growth on international
trade have been an important issue for a long time. However, the papers that
study multi-country dynamic general equilibrium models of international trade
are still few. It may be informative to the reader to compare the present paper
with some of recent works on this topic. Let us compare the present paper
with Bond, Trask, and Wang (BTW) [5]and the two papers by Nishimura and
Shimomura (NS) ([9], [10]).
24As is shown there, BTW [5] and the present paper deal with endogenous
growth models, while the two Nishimura and Shimomura papers study exoge-
nous growth models. As to production externality, while NS (2002) and the
present paper assume factor-generated externalities, BTW [5] and NS [10] as-
sume away such distortions.
Next, let us compare the implications of those models. First, while it is
possible in NS [10] that there is a continuum of equilibrium paths in a neighbor-
hood of a steady state, BTW [5] concentrate on characterizing balanced growth
paths.
Second, both NS [9] and the present paper derive the local indeterminacy.
Third, let us compare trade pattern among the four papers. BTW [5] deﬁne
static and dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin trade patterns; static trade pattern means
that at each point in time the relationship between the dierence in factor
endowment ratios and trade pattern is as suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin
theorem in the standard trade theory; dynamic trade pattern means that the
relationship between the dierence in factor endowment ratios at a point in time
and trade pattern after that point in time is Heckscher-Ohlin. In the case of
the BTW model, static Heckscher-Ohlin trade pattern does not necessarily hold
because in the model there is an educational sector which produces a nontraded
good called educational services which uses physical and human capital; thus
for example, under the assumption that the production of educational services
is physical capital intensive, if the physical capital abundant country produce
more educational services than the other country, it is possible that the ratio
of the amounts of physical and human capital stocks that can be used in the
investment and consumption goods in the former country is smaller than the
other country, in which case static H-O trade pattern does not hold. If static
H-O pattern does not hold, neither does dynamic H-O pattern.
On the other hand, both NS [9] and NS [10] satisfy static H-O trade pattern.
However, if indeterminacy takes place, dynamic H-O trade pattern may not hold.
See Figure 5. In those papers there is a continuum of steady state, say ABC.
Indeterminacy in those models mean that as long as the initial international
distribution of physical and human capital stocks is in a neighborhood of each
steady state, an equilibrium path starting from the initial distribution converges
to the steady state. In a word, it is possible that an equilibrium path can cross
the 45-degree line like DEB. Inspecting this equilibrium path, we see that while
the home country is relatively capital abundant near the initial point D and
therefore it exports a capital intensive good, after crossing the 45-degree line at
E the country becomes relatively labor abundant country and starts exporting
a labor intensive good. Thus, although static H-O trade pattern holds, dynamic
H-O trade pattern does not hold along the equilibrium path.
Compared with the existing three papers, it is ambiguous whether static and
dynamic H-O pattern holds if b =1 .I f b is not equal to one, the BGP trade
pattern is clearly obtained. For exempt, if b<1, i.e., if the foreign household
incur higher disutility (pain) than the home household in order to produce
a given amount of new human capital, the foreign household will choose more
consumption good and less psychic cost. Therefore, the home household exports
25the investment good.
Trade pattern is still ambiguous along a transitional path when b =1 .H o w -
ever, based on the results from the exogenous growth model in the NS [9], we
may conjecture that dynamic H-O pattern do not necessarily hold when inde-
terminacy takes place.
In this paper we assume that the human capital is augmented by the eort
of households involving "psychic cost" or disutility. Alternatively, one could
assume that to accumulate human capital, the household incur a pecuniary cost
or time cost. It is certainly interesting to pursue the same topic as we did in
this paper and to compare the results with ours. In doing so, it may be crucial
how those costs are formulated in dynamic trade models. For example, let us
incorporate a pecuniary cost in such way that the ﬂow budget constraint (13)
and the dynamic equation of human capital (14) are rewritten as
•
K = wL+ rK +   pC  h
•
L = hL1,
where h denotes the pecuniary cost measured by the investment good, and





etdt,0 <  < 1, > 0
Then, one may ﬁnd that the dynamic general equilibrium model based on the
pecuniary cost is formally almost the same as the one developed in this paper;
one could then conjecture that the analytical implications are also similar.
The model presented in this paper can be thought as a benchmark model in
the sense that, just like the conventional static two by two by two Heckscher-
Ohlin model, there seem to be many directions of extending it. Introducing
factor-generated externalities, which we have done here, is only one of them.
Imperfect competition, output-generated externalities, increasing returns, trade
policies, ... are other issues we may be able to incorporate into the present
benchmark model,which are our future research agenda.
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8A p p e n d i x
8 . 1 T h ep r o o fo fL e m m a1













1    
(r  )
=
(r  r2)(r  )  (r  r1)(r  )  (1    )(r  r1)(r  r2)
(r  r1)(r  )(r  r2)
(a1)
Since the numerator,
(r  r2)(r  )  (r  r1)(r  )  (1    )(r  r1)(r  r2),
27is a quadratic equation of r, 0(r)=0h a sa tm o s tt w or o o t s . O nt h eo t h e r
hand, limr$+ (r)=l i m r$r2 (r)=4 implies that 0(r)=0must have an
odd number of roots. Therefore, 0(r)=0has a unique solution in ( , r2). (ii)
From (i),  < r<r 2. It can be easily shown that  <r 0 <r 2.







1    
(r0  )
=
(1  )(1 + 12)
(1 + 12)
> 0
Since 0(r) > 0 for r 5 (r,r2) and (¯ r)=0 , r<r 0 follows from 0(r0) > 0.
(QED)
8.2 The Proof of Lemma 2




X = 21xp + 22X











































Since 11 6=0 , it follows that all characteristic roots are the same between (a2)
and (a3). (QED)
8.3 The Proof of Lemma 3
To prove the lemma, let us calculate det[22].
16Note that K11 is a scalar.
28det[22]=
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
AR  wl22 wl22 0  l
AR 00
wl22 AR  wl22 00  l
AR 0






















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= Q
×
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
AR  wl22 wl22 0  l
AR 0
wl22 AR  wl22 00  l
AR












¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= Q
×
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
000  l
AR 0
000 0  l
AR
















































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
w22 w22 0

l {wl22 +   (1    )R} w22 1
w22

l {wl22 +   (1    )R} 1









¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
110

l {  (1    )R} 01
0

l {  (1    )R} 1
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
= 2Q22wl(GAR)2
29Thus, sign[det22]=sign[Q]sign[22]. From (11) we see that sign[22]=


































which implies (54). (QED)
8 . 4 T h ep r o o fo fL e m m a4
Dierentiating (51) with respect to  at 0,
J0
2(0) =



































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
[r0
  Rp] 2w22
Rp 

l {  (1  )R +2 wl22}













¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
[r0
  Rp]2 wl22
r0
 {  (1  )R}








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
11 2wl21
Gw0
w AR  Rp(  (1  )R)
GAR
2wl22(  (1  )R)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
2p1 1

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
[r0
  Rp]2 wl22
r0
 {  (1  )R}
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Considering r + R +











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯  2p1 1

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
[r0
  Rp]2 wl22
r0
 0
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯




It follows that if r0 > 0( w0 < 0) and  + 0, then J0
2(0) > 0.(QED)
8.5 The Proof of Lemma 5
It is clear from J2(0) > 0 and sign[J000
2 (0)] = sign[11] < 0 that J2()=0has
at least one positive real root. Let us denote the positive real root by 0 and
the remaining two roots by 1 and 2. Then J2() can be written as
J2()=11(  0)(  1)(  2)
= 11
3  11(0 + 1 + 2)
2
+11{12 + 0(1 + 2)}
11120
If J2(0) = 11120 > 0, 11 < 0 and 0 > 0, then 12 > 0. Therefore, if
the coe!cient of ,J 0
2(0) = 11{12 + 0(1 + 2)}, is positive, the real parts
of both 1 and 2 have to be negative due to the following reason: suppose that
1 and 2 are complex roots, ) ± i, where ) and  are real numbers: then,
12 = )2 + 
2 > 0 and 1 + 2 =2 );
therefore, if 11{12 + 0(1 + 2)} > 0, then 1 + 2 =2 ) < 0.(QED)
8.6 The Proof of Lemma 6
Let us prove that, if  > 0 and ˆ  < 0, 11 is negative for a su!ciently small
. Let r(pe) be approximately equal to . Then, since R =2 wl22  ¯ 12 ;
1
(  )=0 ,
p11 =( 1 
1




















)(¯ 11¯ 22  ¯ 12¯ 21)





















  {r1122  w1221}
In order that this inequality makes sense, the right-hand side of it must be
positive. Considering (10), ˆ  < 0 means r < 0 and w > 0. Therefore,  > 0
guarantees the positiveness.
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